B. About a Concept Univocal to God and Creatures

26. Secondly [n.24] I say that not only in a concept analogous to a concept of creatures is God conceived (namely in a concept that is altogether other than that which is said of creatures), but in some concept univocal to him and creatures. And so that there be no dispute about the name of univocity, I mean by a univocal concept a concept that is so one that the unity of it suffices for contradiction, for affirming and denying it of the same thing; suffices too for a syllogistic middle term, so that the extreme terms [sc. major and minor], when united in a middle term thus one, may be deduced, without the fallacy of equivocation, to be united between themselves.

27. [Reasons for univocity]. And univocity thus understood I prove in five ways. The Vatican editors remark that Scotus actually wrote ‘three ways’, but five is necessary because of parts of the text Scotus added later without being able to revise the internal references accordingly. ¹⁰ First as follows: every intellect, certain of one concept and doubtful of diverse ones, has a concept about which it is certain different from the concepts about which it is doubtful; the subject here [‘every intellect.’] includes the predicate [‘has a concept...’]. But the intellect of a wayfarer can be certain that God is a being while in doubt about whether he is finite or infinite, created or uncreated; therefore, the concept of being said of God is different from the former and latter concepts [sc. ‘finite’ ‘infinite’ ‘created’ ‘uncreated’], and so, of itself, it is neither of them and is included in each of them; therefore it is univocal.

28. The proof of the major is that no same concept is certain and doubtful; therefore either it is a different concept, which is the point at issue, or no concept - and then there will not be certitude about any of the concepts.

29. The proof of the minor is that every philosopher was certain that what he posited as first principle was a being, as that one of them was certain about fire that it was a being and another certain about water that it was a being;a but he was not certain that it were a created or an uncreated being, first or not first. For he was not certain that it was first, because then he would have been certain about what is false and the false is not knowable; nor certain that it was not the first being, for then the philosophers would not have posited the opposite [sc. that it was the first being]. There is a confirmation too, for someone seeing the philosophers disagreeing could have been certain that whatever one of them posited as first principle was a being and yet, because of the contrariety of their opinions, could have doubted whether the first principle was this being [sc. fire] or that being [sc. water]. And if a demonstration were given to such doubting person proving or destroying any lower concept (as that fire will not be the first being but will be a being posterior to the first being), the first concept certain to him, the concept he had about being, would not be destroyed but preserved in the particular concept that was proved about fire [sc. that fire is not the first being]; and hereby is proved the point at issue, the point supposed in the ultimate consequence of the reasoning [n.27, end], which was that the certain concept, which of itself is neither of the doubtful ones, is preserved in each of them.

a.a [Interpolated text] and univocally conceived being.

30. And if you do not care about the authority taken from the diversity of philosophizers’ opinions, but you say [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.21 q.2] that everyone has in his intellect two concepts close to each other which, because of the closeness of analogy, seem to be a single concept - against this seems to be that then, by this evasion, the whole way of proving the univocal unity of any concept would be destroyed; for if you say that ‘man’ has one concept as referred to Socrates and Plato, it will be denied you, and it will be said that they are two but seem one because of their close similarity.

31. Besides, the two concepts are simply simple; therefore, not intelligible save distinctly and totally. Therefore, if they are not seen to be two now, not afterwards either.

32. Again, they are conceived either as altogether disparate, and it is a wonder how they seem to be one; or conceived as comparable according to analogy or to likeness or to distinctness, and then they are conceived as distinct at once or in advance. Therefore, they are not seen as one.

33. Again, in positing two concepts you posit two known formal objects. How are they two known formal objects and not objects known as distinct?

34. Further, if the intellect were to understand singulars in their proper idea, then, although the concepts of two things of the same species would be very similar (it is, however, not doubtful that they are much more similar than the two in the issue at hand [finite, infinite, created, uncreated, n.29], because these two differ in species), still the intellect would distinguish well between such concepts of singulars. This response [n.30] is also rejected in d.8 q.3 [d.8 p.1 q.3 n.7], as is one other response [d.8 nn.5-6] that denies the major [nn.27-28].

35. Secondly I argue principally as follows:a no real concept is caused naturally in the intellect of the wayfarer save by things that naturally move our intellect; but these things are phantasms (or an object shining forth in a phantasm) and the agent intellect; therefore no simple concept is naturally brought about now in our intellect unless it can be brought about by virtue of these. But a concept that would not be univocal to an object shining forth in a phantasm (but one altogether different, prior, to which the object would have an analogy) cannot be brought about by virtue of the agent intellect and the phantasm; therefore the sort of different, analogous concept that is posited will never exist naturally in the intellect of a wayfarer; and so a concept of God will not be able to be had naturally, which is false.

a.a [Note by Scotus] This second argument can be confirmed, against Henry, through what is found in d.8 p.1 q.3 n.4; but there is a response there.

Proof of the assumption [sc. “But a concept that would not be univocal to an object shining forth in a phantasm...”]: any object, whether shining forth in the phantasm or in the intelligible species, along with the cooperation of the agent or possible intellect, produces according to the ultimate of its power, as an effect adequate to it, its own proper concept,a and a concept of everything essentially or virtually included in it. But the other concept, which is posited to be an analogous concept, is not essentially or virtually included in this one; nor even is it this one; therefore, this one will not be brought about by any such moving object [sc. by an object that brings about the analogous concept].

a.a [Interpolated text (in place of “its own proper concept, and a concept of everything.. .any such moving object.”)] .its own proper and quidditative concept. For this is the offspring adequate to it in its being as knowable in itself, just as an offspring like it in nature would be adequate in natural being. So, in the understanding of anything that our intellect can operate on, that understanding will be more imperfect than its own [self-understanding], and consequently not per se attributable to it; because the more perfect is not attributed to the less perfect; therefore, in no way is it possible to have any knowledge naturally of God [cf. nn.48-49].

And there is confirmation of the reasoning (that ‘any object, whether.’ [previous paragraph]). Besides its proper concept, adequate to it and included in it in either of the two aforesaid ways [sc. ‘essentially or virtually’ - previous paragraph], nothing else can be known from this object save by discursive reasoning; but discursive reasoning presupposes knowledge of the simple thing to which the discourse leads. Let the reason, therefore, be formed as follows: that no object brings about in this intellect a proper simple concept of another object unless it contain that object essentially or virtually; but a created object does not contain an uncreated object essentially or virtually (and this under the idea under which it is attributed to an uncreated object as something essentially posterior is attributed to something essentially prior; because it is against the idea of the essentially posterior to include its prior virtually); and it is plain that a created object does not essentially contain an uncreated object according to anything altogether proper, and not common, to an uncreated object;     therefore it does not bring about a concept that is simple and proper to an uncreated being.

36. There is argument, third, as follows: the concept proper to a subject is an idea sufficient for proving of that subject all the things that can be conceived as necessarily being present in it; but we have no concept of God by which we could sufficiently know all the things conceived by us that are necessarily in him - it is plain about the Trinity and other necessary points of faith; therefore etc     .

The proof of the major is that we know any immediate truth to the extent we know the terms; so the major is plain about anything conceivable that is immediately present in the concept of the subject. But if it is present in it mediately, the same argument will be made about a middle term related to the subject; and wherever a stand is made, the proposed thesis about immediates is obtained; and further, through them will the mediates be known.

38. Again, fourth, an argument can be made as follows: either a pure perfection [lit.: a perfection simply] has an idea common to God and creatures, and the thesis is obtained. Or it does not but has only an idea proper to creatures; and then the idea of it will not belong formally to God, which is unacceptable. Or it has an idea that is altogether proper to God, and then it follows that, because God is pure perfection, nothing is to be attributed to him; for this is to say nothing else save that, because its idea as it belongs to God states ‘pure perfection’, therefore is it posited in God; and so will perish Anselm’s doctrine in the Monologion ch.15, where he maintains that ‘passing over relations, in the case of all other things, whatever is simply better it than not it is to be attributed to God, just as whatever is not such is to be removed from God’. According to Anselm, then, first something is known to be such [sc. ‘better it than not it’] and second it is attributed to God; therefore, it is not such precisely as it is in God. This is also confirmed in that then no pure perfection would exist in creatures. The consequence is plain, because of no such perfection does even a concept belong to creatures, save an analogical concept that, from the hypothesis, is of itself such - for an analogical concept is imperfect, and in nothing is its idea better than not it, because otherwise it would be posited, according to that analogical idea, in God.

39. This fourth reason is also confirmed as follows:a every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in this way: by considering the formal idea of something and taking away from that formal idea the imperfection that it has in creatures; and by keeping hold of the formal idea and attributing to it an altogether supreme perfection, and attributing it thus to God. An example about the formal idea of wisdom, or intellect or will; for this is considered in itself and by itself, and from the fact that this idea does not include formally any imperfection or limitation, the imperfections that are concomitant with it in creatures are removed from it and, with the same idea of wisdom and of will retained, these are attributed most perfectly to God.b Therefore, all inquiry about God supposes the intellect to have the same univocal concept it has taken from creatures.

a.a In place of the text from the beginning of n.36 up to here, which were clearly added later, are the words, canceled by Scotus, ‘Thirdly it is argued as follows’

b.b [Note by Scotus] For this there are certain middle terms [taken from Augustine, Anselm, Dionysius] in distinction 8 question 3, ‘against the first opinion’ [d.8 p.1 q.3 nn.8-9].

40. But if you say [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.32 q.4] the formal idea of the things that belong to God is different - from this follows something unacceptable, that from no idea proper to them as they are in creatures can they be proved of God, because the idea of the former is altogether different from the idea of the latter. Indeed, from the idea of wisdom that we grasp from creatures, it will no more be proved that God is formally wise than that God is formally a stone. For a concept different from the concept of a created stone can be formed, to which concept of stone, as it is an idea in God, this stone has an [analogous] attribution; and so ‘God is a stone’ would be asserted formally according to this analogous concept [of stone], just as ‘God is wise’ would be asserted formally according to the analogous concept [of wise].

41. An argument for this is also, fifth, made as follows: a more perfect creature can move [the intellect] to a more perfect concept of God. Therefore, since some vision of God, for example the lowest, does not differ from any given abstractive intellection of him as much as the highest creature differs from the lowest, it seems to follow that, if the lowest can move [the intellect] to some abstractive intellection, that the highest creature, or any creature below it, will be able to move [the intellect] to an intuitive intellection, which is impossible.

42. But if you say [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.24 q.6] that there are as many degrees in abstractive intellection of God as there are created species, though the intellects at the extremes are not as distant from each other as are the species at the extremes, which is very possible, because any degree in intellections is less distant from the degree next to it than the created species moving [the intellect] to that one is distant from the species moving it to another one - on the contrary: the difference of abstractive intellections is not merely numerical, because they are caused by causes of different species and through the proper ideas of those species, not insofar as they include something common as the way about univocity says. Therefore it follows that between the lowest abstractive intellection and the lowest intuitive intellection there are more intermediates than between the lowest species of being and the highest, or there are as many. But if the consequent is unacceptable, then, through the consequent, the antecedent too. Therefore, the species of abstractive intellection are fewer than those of beings. Therefore, by beginning from the lowest from this side and that, a species of being is left that is higher than the one that causes the highest abstractive knowledge. Therefore, that higher one will cause intuitive knowledge of God.

43. Again, why are so many species of intellections of the same object posited, if the object moves [the intellect] to a proper concept?

44. Again, as to the principal conclusion [the univocity of being, n.26], it seems to be that every multitude is reduced to unity [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.21 q.2 ad 2]. Therefore the same holds of concepts.a

a.a [Note added by Scotus] Note, about the second point [n.26], there are ten arguments: first about certain and doubtful concept [n.27], second about the impossibility as wayfarer of understanding God [n.35], third that we do not know all the things that necessarily inhere in God [n.36], fourth that some pure perfection is common [n.38], fifth about the order of intellection alongside the order of creatures moving [the intellect] to them [n.41], sixth can be next to it, that there would be infinite abstractive intellections if the species are infinite. These reasons are specific [to the question]. Common reasons are: coming to a stand at unity [n.44], number and otherness [Ord. I d.8 p.1 q.3 n.12], comparison [ibid.], and ‘truest etc.’ in Metaphysics 2.993b24-27.
     As to the first argument, in Ord. I d.8 nn.5-8, are the three responses of Henry; the two first are attacked there, and the second here [n.30; for the third see n.46]. - To the second argument, Henry infra in Ord. I d.8 nn.4-5 and the rejection of him there; and here below the argument is dealt with so as to be a common difficulty against both sides, but by way of giving an exposition of the opinion about the analogy of concepts for those very concepts [n.54]. - To the third it is said [by Henry] that some proper concept can be had of a subject, a confused non-definitive concept, by which nothing, even what is most immediately inherent in a subject, is evident about it (an example: one does not know through a confused concept of man that he is capable of laughter); and every concept of ours, though a proper concept, is yet not perfect as a concept definitive of a creature is. There is a confirmation because in Ord. II d.3 p.2 q.2 [nn.7, 11] the article concedes that an angel has in natural things a proper concept of God, and yet in the prologue [Ord. prol. nn.152] theology is set down as naturally known to God alone. - To the fourth, that is said to be a pure perfection [by Henry, Summa a.32 q.4, a.42 q.1 ad 1] which is of a nature to possess concepts that have an analogy of the imperfect to the perfect, so that the idea of ‘pure perfection’ is not attributed to something that is simply one even in concept. But the deduction of the saints and the masters seems to confirm that [cf. Ord. I. d.8 nn.8-9]. - To the confirmation there [n.40], that ‘God is a stone’, response is given in I d.8 n.9. - The fifth [nn.42-43] is solved here, where the argument is [n.41]. But to the point against the response [n.42], I reply: one must state it by holding to the specific difference of intellections. One must concede that there are as many species of abstractive conceptions of God as there are species of objects moving [the intellect]. The same is against you, Henry, because the words proper to creatures are as many in species as there are creatures (it could be argued there that, if the species of words for creatures are fewer than the things named, then some creature can cause an intellection more perfect than any word for a creature, and so cause the vision of God). In the way the response is made here [above, first paragraph of this note], it is made to the abstractive intellections of God through creatures, because on both sides there are as many intellections as there are objects moving [the intellect]. - The sixth argument [first paragraph of this note] is likewise against you, Henry, because it is necessary to concede an infinity of words, each of which is lower than the vision of God, if the hypothesis is retained about infinite, necessity, eternity, as they are precisely modes [n.55], because thus are they simply simple concepts.
     Therefore, you should care about the first reason and the fourth alone, both because they are not equally difficult for both sides, and because they do not go too far in proof beyond the proposed conclusion [n.26]. For they do not prove that no concept proper to God can be had, but that some concept cannot be. And the first negation [sc. no concept proper to God can be had] seems false.
     But really, will many quidditative concepts come through the different creatures moving the intellect, and are they of different species or the same, and will several concepts or one always be intended at the same time when several creatures are moving the intellect? - Again, you deny intelligible species [n.251].

45. But of what sort the univocity of being is, how many and what things it extends to, will be spoken of rather in the question about the first object of the intellect [nn.130-151].

46. [Objections against the aforesaid reasons] - Against these reasons is objection made. Against the first reason about the total disjunct [n.27], and the response is set down in d.8 p.1 q.3 n.68, and is more weakly refuted than others are [supra, second paragraph of added note to n.44].

47. As to the second (as it is briefly stated [n.35]), the major is denied, because, on account of their connection, the effect can produce some concept of the cause, though not as perfect as the cause can about itself. For it is conceded that the conclusion produces knowledge of the principle in a demonstration of the ‘that’ [sc. as opposed to a demonstration of the ‘why’]; but that is not the most perfect knowledge of a principle; rather that knowledge is by which the conclusion is known through terms perfectly known. For why (unlike in the case of concepts) will an effect simply apprehended cause some simple habitual knowledge of the cause?

48. To the proof of the major [n.35, third paragraph], I say that although an equivocal effect has no power over the existing equivocal cause, nor over anything of the same idea as the cause [sc. to produce a concept of them], yet it does have power over some knowledge of it, which knowledge is more imperfect not only than the very cause in itself, but also than the cause in the very equivocal effect of the cause, namely than a perfect concept of it. But let the major be taken in this way: “no object has power for a concept of anything unless it contain that concept virtually or essentially.” This seems manifest from the idea of cause and equivocal effect [infra n.429], and although action be attributed to the intellect, according to some (I care not), the object, in whatever way it is required, has no power for a concept more perfect than a concept adequate to itself; such is the proper quidditative concept;     therefore etc     . The proof of the minor [“such is the proper quidditative concept”] is that, in the case of equivocal effects of the same cause, that effect is most perfect which is most like the cause; such is the intellectual offspring, or the perfect word, of this object. The proof of the major [“the object.. .has no power for a concept more perfect.”] because then [sc. if the major were false] the perfection of intelligence would exceed the whole power of the memory.

49. It seems one must absolutely concede that, by the action of a created object, no concept of God could come to be in us that is more perfect than the perfect concept proper to that object, nor consequently [could there come to be in us] a concept to which this concept, proper to the moving object, may be attributed [sc. analogically]; indeed further, the concept of God is more imperfect than this word, because an equivocal effect is less like the cause. It is necessary, therefore, to depart from the opinion of Henry if he posit that the concept of a stone is attributed [sc. by analogy] to the concept that the stone causes of God. It is possible to preserve the attribution precisely of the object conceived to the object, but not the attribution of the concept to the concept. And this is possible enough, for it is about a more perfect concept that a more imperfect concept is obtained rather than about a more imperfect concept. And how is it reasonable that, in the same intellect, a proper concept of God is simply more imperfect than a concept of stone or white? And how will natural beatitude exist in the knowledge of God (from Ethics 10.7.1177a12-17)?

50. But there seems to be the same difficulty against the univocity of being [sc. as against analogy, n.49], because every concept of God will be less perfect than the perfect proper concept of white, since every such concept is contained in whiteness as a common concept is contained in a special one, and the common concept is simply less perfect, because it is a potential and partial one with respect to the special concept. How then, according to univocity, will beatitude exist in natural knowledge of God?

51. Response. Any concept simply simple [n.71], namely of univocity, is more imperfect positively than the word [sc. the intelligible word, or the concept] of white, that is, it does not posit as much perfection; however it is more perfect permissively, because it abstracts from limitation and so is conceivable under [the idea of] infinity; and then the concept, simple indeed but not simply simple, namely ‘infinite being’, will be more perfect than the [intelligible] word of white, and it will be proper to God, but not the prior one that is common and abstracted from whiteness. Hence the way of univocity holds that every concept proper to God is more perfect than the word of any created thing, but the other way not so.

52. But there is a twofold objection against this response: first by arguing that the difficulty remains against the way of univocity, because from two concepts, each of which is more imperfect than the word [concept] of white, there does not seem to come to be a concept more perfect than that word. But the concept of being, as is conceded [n.51], is more imperfect than the concept of white or of line. And the concept of the infinite likewise; the proof is that the infinite is conceived by us through something finite, the finite conceived through a line, or some such object, moving us to a concept of the property [of finitude]. Therefore, the concept of the infinite is more imperfect than the concept of line. There is a confirmation of the argument, that a concept that includes affirmation and negation is not more perfect because of the negation, or at least is not more perfect than by conceiving the affirmation of the negation; here [in the way of univocity] infinite being is not a concept of something positive besides being; therefore infinity does not make the concept perfect, or at any rate there will not be a more perfect concept of infinite being than of finite being.

53. A second objection in favor of Henry is made in a similar way: that although a simply simple concept is more imperfect than the word or concept of a creature, as the argument says, [n.51], yet many such concepts can be put together, and one will determine the other, and the whole concept will be more perfect. And there is no greater difficulty here [in the way of analogy] than there [the way of univocity] save on two points: first that here any concept [‘infinite’, ‘being’], whether determining or determinable, is posited as proper to God, and there one is common [‘being’ as univocal] and the other proper [‘infinite’ as proper to God]; second: that here some concept proper to God is conceded to be more imperfect than the word of a creature [n.52], there that none is [n.51, end]. Now the first of these points is not unacceptable, because the property does indeed determine the subject (as in ‘man’ and ‘capable of laughter’), and yet both terms [‘man’ ‘capable of laughter’ - and similarly ‘being’, ‘infinite’] are equally common [sc. in what they are predicated of]. The second point one should altogether concede, because of this second argument here [n.53] - when speaking of the concept, that is, of the act of conceiving, but not of the object conceived.

54. As concerns these objections [nn.52-53], it seems that a response sufficiently fitting is that each opinion [sc. the opinions of analogy and of univocity] posits a simply simple concept more perfect than the word of that which moves to a part [of that simply simple concept; n.51 end, n.53 beginning]. But the objection made in the arguing [sc. for Henry, nn.52-53] seems to be against both opinions, because however many things are put together, each of the concepts is impressed [on the intellect] by a creature moving [the intellect]. Therefore, each is more imperfect than the word of the creature. How will an aggregation of more imperfect concepts make a concept that is intensively more perfect? The confirmation too [n.52] objects well against the point about the infinite. Not for this reason, then, must the opinion [of the univocity of being] be rejected, because the difficulty is common to both, and equally so, if the analogy of concepts be expounded about concepts.

55. Perhaps the objections [nn.52-53] do well prove that an act [of the intellect] about God is not the most perfect intensively; and this is not required for natural beatitude to exist there, but [it is enough] that there be union with the most perfect object (Parts of Animals 1.5.644b31-33). And perhaps some creature is more intensely loved than God, and yet it does not, when loved, beatify as God does (about this in Ord. IV d.49 p.1 qq.1-2 [nn.1-4 19-32], ‘how we are beatified in the object’). This point about the infinite being [sc. ‘an act about God is not the most perfect intensively’] would be true if ‘infinite’ were precisely the mode under which the object were conceived, and not a part of the concept, or were the mode such that the concept in itself is conceived - the way the distinction was drawn [Ord. I d.2 n.183] in the question of the unity of God, about singularity as conceived and as the mode precisely under which something is conceived; the way too that a certain degree of intensity is precisely the mode under which this whiteness is seen. But we do not understand ‘infinite being’ thus, but as including two concepts, albeit one of them [‘infinite’] determine the other [‘being’]. And perhaps the privative concept of the infinite [sc. the infinite conceived as the privation or negation of finitude, from Henry of Ghent n.35] does not posit anything, although it does give a positive understanding, such that, if we do have a positive concept of the necessary, God, the simply necessary being, is more perfectly understood in it positively. But perhaps we conceive neither the necessary nor the eternal except as negation of imperfection: for example, of the potency to be differently disposed or of ability to be in flux, of beginning or end - the eternal states an infinite of a sort, for an infinity in duration is not at all more perfect than one in quantity of perfection, just as an infinite magnitude would be more perfect than an infinite time.